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Abstract
Alliances often face both free-riding and hold-up problems, which under-
mine the e¤ectiveness of alliances in mobilizing joint ghting e¤ort. Despite
of these disadvantages, alliances are still ubiquitous in all types of contests.
This paper asks if there are non-monetary incentives to form alliances, e.g.,
intimidating/discouraging the single player(s) who is/are left alone. For this
purpose, I compare symmetric (2 vs. 2) and asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests
to their equivalent 4-player and 3-player individual contests, respectively.
We nd that alliance players in symmetric (2 vs. 2) contests behave the
same as those in equivalent 4-player individual contests. However, in asym-
metric (2 vs. 1) contests, stand-alone players were strongly discouraged to
exert e¤ort (especially the females), compared to the 3-player individual
contests. Alliance players may have anticipated this e¤ect and also reduced
their e¤ort, if alliances share the prize according to the merit rule. Behavi-
oural factors such as the need to belong can help reconcile the "paradox of
alliance formation".
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1 Introduction
The distribution of resources in the world more or less resembles the nature of
contest in economic theory. Namely, a group of players, whether individuals,
enterprises, interest groups, or countries, expend costly e¤ort to compete for some
common prize(s). Examples of their competitive interactions range from individual
beauty or sport contests to wars and military contests among countries. Tullock
(1967) was the rst to formalize contests in a rent-seeking environment, and sub-
sequent theories in this eld have developed along di¤erent dimensions and been
applied in various contexts.1 Furthermore, when there are more than two players in
a contest, alliances which allow members to pool their resources in the ght against
common adversaries, are often observed in wars, political elections, rent-seeking
activities, patent races, etc.
Despite of the pervasiveness of alliances in practice, doubts have persisted about
its success and e¤ectiveness. For example, Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser
(1966) point out that the typical collective action problem gives alliance members
strong incentives to free-ride on other memberse¤ort, and free-riding problems
become more severe as the number of alliance players increases. Therefore, Olson
(1965) suggests that small groups are actually more e¤ective and more likely to
win the contests (i.e., the so-called paradox of group size). This paradox has
been proven in some specic contexts (e.g., Tullock 1980; Katz and Tokatlidu 1996;
Baik and Lee 1997), but not necessarily in others (Chamberlin 1974; Mac Guire
1974; Sandler 1993; Esteban and Ray 1999; 2001).
More recent studies focus on endogenous alliance formation rather than exo-
genously changing the size of contest groups. In a three-player model, Skaperdas
(1998) and Esteban and SÃ ¾akovics (2003) show that individual players have no
incentive to form a two-player alliance, not only because of the free-riding prob-
lem, but also because they perceive the possibility of future internal conict among
alliance players who must share the prize after defeating their adversaries. The
sharing process might ex ante attempt to be peaceful, but no guarantee ensures it
would be. In that case, a subsequent contest may take place to determine the nal
winner among the victorious alliance, a process that involves further costly e¤ort
1See Konrad (2009) for a review.
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and reduces the expected payo¤ for alliance players. Therefore, anticipation of
future conict further reduces the alliance membersincentive to expend e¤ort in
the inter-alliance contest and, consequently, its winning probability and expected
payo¤. The widely observed practice of alliance formation, even in the face of these
two major disadvantages, constitute the paradox of alliance formation(Konrad
2009). However, in more complex settings in which players are asymmetric and
budget constrained or possess complementary resources that increase the alliances
capability (Konrad and Kovenock 2009; Skaperdas 1998), stable alliance formation
might emerge endogenously in equilibrium (for a review, see Bloch 2009).
Instead of looking for the missing factors that might resolve the alliance forma-
tion paradox in theory, I aim to understand the paradox in the original setup using
experimental methods. In particular, I study whether simply being in an alliance
has an impact on the behavior of alliance members and/or stand-alone players,
especially when alliance formation makes the competing parties asymmetric (in
terms of the number of players in each party). There has being long-standing
discussions in psychology about humans need to belong, especially when others
are in groups.2 The formation of the alliance could benet the alliance players
by intimidating the more lonesome individual players, if there is indeed the need
to belong.3 Recent experiments in economics also show that people behave dif-
ferently when they are in groups versus alone in both strategic and non-strategic
situations (Charness et al. 2007; Sutter 2009).4 Whether and how potential be-
havioral or psychological factors inuence the contest behavior of players both
within and outside the alliance, could have strong impacts on the attractiveness
of alliance formation. The experiment reported herein aims to better understand
these hypotheses.
In order to study the pure framing e¤ects of alliances, the sharing rule between
2See Baumeister and Leary (1995) for more literature.
3There are also other similar arguments. For example, McCallum et al. (1985) propose that
people care more about winning and behave more aggressively when they compete in groups.
Campbell (1965) argues that people are more willing to contribute to group causes, even if this
requires risk to their own lives (i.e., group spirits). The reasons that people behave di¤erently
in groups versus individually likely are multifaceted though.
4Expansive literature deals with group identiy and group or team decisions versus individual
decision making in psychology and economics. Recent articles (e.g., Charness et al. 2007; Chen
and Li 2009; Sutter 2009; Ambrus et al. 2009) o¤er more detailed reviews.
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the allaince members has to chosen such that there is no monetary incentive/disincentive
of being in an alliance. Egalitarian (or equal) sharing rule and merit (or proportional-
sharing) rule are the most commonly used versions in prior literature. Under the
egalitarian/equal sharing rule, members of the alliance receive equal shares of the
prize, irrespective of how much they have contributed in the inter-alliance contest,
so a free-riding problem arises. In the merit rule, members share the prize accord-
ing to their relative contributions to the inter-alliance contest, and the free-riding
problem is fully eliminated.5 Players should be equally incentivized, irrespective of
being in an alliance or not, and thus be indi¤erent between competing individually
or forming an alliance.6 Therefore, comparing contest behavior with alliances to
its equavilent individual contests provides a natural way to study whether there is
a pure framing e¤ect of being in an alliance.
The experiment consists of three treatments. In the base treatment, three in-
dividual players each decide independently the e¤ort they will expend in a contest,
and a lottery wheel draws the winner afterwards, according to a standard Tullock
lottery contest success function (i.e., the winning probability of each player is de-
termined by the ratio of their e¤ort to the total e¤ort of all three players). In two
experimental (alliance) treatments, two players enter an alliance to contest the
third player. The winning probability for the third player stays the same, but the
alliances winning probability is equal to the ratio of alliance playersjoint e¤ort
over the total e¤ort of all three players. I call this scenario an inter-alliance contest,
hereafter though the third player is only in an alliance with him- or herself.
5Alliance players can always break up and engage in a sub-contest after victory, so these
peaceful sharing solutions may not be enforceable, which demands consideration of the sub-
contest sharing rule. In a previous paper, Ke et al. (2010) compare the equal sharing and
sub-contest sharing rules to identify the size of the hold-up problem in an inter-alliance contest,
induced by the further dissipative intra-alliance contest. In this study I deliberately choose the
proportional sharing rule to eliminate both the free-riding problem and the hold-up problem
(induced by the threat of potential internal conict).
6Another rule broadly discussed in theory uses convex combinations of both equal sharing
and proportional sharing. Taking the combined ratio as an exogenous choice, Nitzan (1991a,
1991b), Davis and Reilly (1999), and Ueda (2002) study how equilibrium e¤ort changes with
this ratio. Lee (1995), Baik and Shogren (1995), Baik and Lee (1997), and Noh (1999, 2002)
further endogenize the sharing rule and nd that alliances of symmetric group size choose the
proportional sharing rule, even though they would be better o¤ if everyone chose equal sharing
rule. In reality, both equal and proportional sharing rules have disadvantages. Although the
proportional rule eliminates free-riding, it can be very costly or even infeasible to enforce when
e¤ort can not be monitored easily.
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The di¤erence between the two alliance-treatments pertains to the sharing rule
implementation stage. In the rst alliance treatment, after defeating the stand-
alone player, one alliance player is randomly drawn as the nal and sole winner
of the prize. The winning probability of an alliance player (conditional on a joint
victory) is equal to the proportion of the e¤ort he or she contributes to the total
e¤ort by the alliance.7 Compared with that in the base treatment, the winning
probability for each individual alliance player in this treatment is essentially the
same (for given e¤ort choices). In addition, the winner always gets the full prize
in both treatments. Therefore, alliance formation does not change the problem
facing each individual player, and the equilibrium predictions should be identical
to those in the base treatment. The equivalence holds even if I abstract away from
the risk-neutrality assumption, as is often used in contest theories. Therefore, this
design provides the minimum alliance framing possible to identify the psychological
impact of alliance formation. However, in this treatment alliances are somewhat
temporary, because they eventually break up following inter-alliance contests
when the spoils of the alliancess victory are not shared. The prospect that only
one of the two alliances players receives the full prize might signicantly weaken
the tie between alliance members. The perception of tie strenghth between the
alliance players thus might inuence e¤ort choices by the players.
Instead of drawing one winner from the victorious alliance, in the second
alliance-treatment, the prize is shared between the two alliance players. Shar-
ing the fruit of a joint victory should strengthen their tie and make the alliance
manipulation more salient. However, it is still comparable to the other two treat-
ments, because the alliance player still receives a share of the prize that is in
proportion to the e¤ort he or she contributed to the total e¤ort of the alliance.
For a risk-neutral, expected-payo¤maximizer, the equilibrium predictions are the
same as in the other two treatments. Therefore, deviations in this treatment should
indicate how the improved saliency of the alliance feature a¤ects e¤ort choices in
7Although this sharing rule di¤ers slightly from the usual term of the proportional sharing rule,
I count it as a proportional sharing rule. In a sense, it represents a special form of proportional
sharing rule because alliance players share the probability of receiving the sole property rights
of a full prize rather than a share of that prize.
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inter-alliance contests. Furthermore, it is possible to identify (or eliminate) other
potential behavioral factors (e.g., changing risk preference, the need to belong, joy
of winning, group spirit) that could a¤ect the attractiveness of alliance formation
through treatment comparison.
This study thereby o¤ers two major ndings. First, alliance formation has a
signicant impact on stand-alone playerse¤ort choice even if the alliance is only
temporary. When the contest is asymmetric (2 versus 1), the stand-alone player
are more likely to drop out or greatly reduce e¤ort, which conrms that the need
to belong creats psychological disadvantages for lonesome players in the contest
when others are in a group. Second, risk attitudes seem stable, and players do not
play more aggressively in groups. On the contrary, they expend similar e¤ort in
temporary alliances but signicantly less e¤ort in permanent alliances, compared
with individual contests. This result is consistent with the predictions derived
from a simple model that takes the non-monetary utility of winning into consid-
eration. In summary, if alliance members can agree on a sharing rule, such that
the free-riding problem can be eliminated and peaceful sharing is ensured, alliance
formation can benet members both inside and outside the alliance (especially
alliance players) via reduced over-dissipation.
This study also relates to a wide range of experimental studies related to con-
tests. First, experimental tests of contest theories often focus on one-stage con-
tests (Millner and Pratt 1989; 1991; Shogren and Baik 1991; Davis and Reilly
1998; Potters et al. 1998; Anderson and Sta¤ord 2003) or multi-stage contests
(Schmitt et al. 2004; Parco et al. 2005; Sheremeta 2010) and reveal that people
expend much more e¤ort than what would be predicted in equilibrium.8 Similar
to these studies, I nd over-dissipation is the rule in this experiment. Second, in
literature that investigates group contests, Ahn et al. (2011) compare individual-
individual contests, group-group contests, and individual-group contests, nding
over-dissipation in all of them such that they reject the paradox of group size
proposed by Olson (1965). Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) compare e¤ort choices
in individual contests to those in group contests (with intra-group communica-
8The proposed explanations of over-dissipation include the non-monetary utility of winning
(Parco et al. 2005; Sheremeta 2010), misperception of the winning probabilities (Baharad and
Nitzan 2008), quantal response equilibrium, and heterogeneous risk preferences (Goeree et al.
2002, Sheremeta 2011).
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tion and joint decision-making) and nd that group-chosen e¤orts are much lower
than individual e¤ort, which they explain by asserting that groups are more risk-
averse than individuals. Sutter and Strassmair (2009) study how intra and/or
inter-group communication a¤ect e¤ort levels in group contests (with individually
chosen e¤ort); intra-group communication increases contest e¤ort, whereas inter-
group communication facilitates collusion and reduces contest e¤ort. Abbink et al.
(2010) further study the e¤ect of intra-group punishment on inter-group contests
and nd that allowing punishment greatly increases the dissipation rate. In all
these studies, the prize is either non-rivalous among group members or shared
equally. The only experimental studies, to the best of my knowledge, that involve
the proportional sharing rule are Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and Ku-
gler et al. (2010). However, instead of comparing contest behavior in groups than
in individuals, they study the public goods problem embedded in group contests
and focus on comparisons of the impact of two di¤erent sharing rules (equal vs.
proportional).
To establish the ndings and extended of this study, I begin in Section 2 by
explaining the experimental design and implementation. In Section 3, I report the
experimental results, followed by a conclusion in Section 4.
2 Experiment
The experiment is based a standard Tullock (1980) lottery contest. Imagine that
there are three players, A, B and C, who must expend costly e¤ort to win a xed
prize value (V = 450).9 In a baseline treatment (T1), each player simultaneously
and independently chooses an e¤ort level from f0; 1; 2; :::; 250g and compete against
one another. A lottery wheel then draws one winner (i) out of the three players,
according to the winning probability pi = xi=X; where xi is the e¤ort choice of
player i; and X is the total e¤ort of all three players. The winner gets the full prize
and pays for his or her e¤ort; and the losers get nothing (yet still need to pay for
their own e¤ort). Therefore, the expected payo¤ of each individual player is given
by E(i) = piV   xi. For a risk-neutral, expected-payo¤ maximizer, the optimal
9The values of all the parameters are given in units of experimental currency.
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e¤ort choice should be xi =
2
9
V = 100. In equilibrium, each player has a one-third
probability to win the prize, and the expected prot is 50 for every player. In
total, two-thirds of the prize value are dissipated in the contest (in equilibrium).
In two other treatments, all the parameter values remain constant, but play-
ers A and B are forced into an alliance. Alliance formation binds the winning
probability of the alliance players, such that they either jointly win or jointly lose
the contest against player C. Each alliance member still decides the e¤ort he or
she expends independently though. Following the same logic, the probability that
player C wins the prize stays the same as in T1 (p
C
= x
C
=X); and the probability
that the alliance players win the contest is p
AB
= XAB=X (where XAB = xA+ xB;
is the total e¤ort expended by A and B). Therefore, the probability that an alli-
ance player wins the prize depends not only on his or her own e¤ort but also on
the e¤ort of the alliance player. E¤ort is perfectly substitutable between alliance
players. If the alliance loses against player C, player C gets the whole prize (450),
as in the Base treatment. However, if the alliance players win against player C, the
sharing rule between the alliance players di¤ers in two experimental treatments.
In the second treatment, conditional on the alliance winning against player C,
another lottery wheel randomly draws one nal winner between A and B, according
to their previous e¤ort choices relative to the total e¤ort expended by A and B
together. Specically, the probability that player i (A or B) is the nal winner,
conditional on the victory of the alliance, is given by qiAB = xi=XAB . I name this
treatment Arandomwhere A referring to the alliance and random means that
the nal winner in the alliance is randomly decided according to qiAB. Therefore, for
each alliance player, the expected payo¤is calculated as E(i) = (pABqiAB)V xi:
The alliance formation according to this random-proportional rule does not change
the nature of the problem compared with the Base treatment, because the joint
probability that the alliance wins and (at the same time) that this player is drawn
as the nal winner (i.e., p
AB
 qiAB = XABX  xiXAB =
xi
X
) is identical to pi in the Base
treatment. As Table 1 shows, the equilibrium e¤orts, expected prots, and total
rate of dissipation remain unchanged. This equivalence holds even if players are
not risk-neutral.10 The comparison between Arandom and Base allows us to test
10However, if risk preference is not stable (e.g., players might become more or less risk averse
when they are in groups), the prediction might change. The next section details why this is not
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the pure framing e¤ect of alliance formation, such as when people become more
or less competitive as the institutional organization of the competition changes.
Similar to the Arandom treatment, A and B again are forced into an alli-
ance in the third treatment. However, in case of a victory, alliance players A
and B share the prize in proportion to what they have contributed in the contest
against player C. I name this treatment Aproportion. Let siAB be the share
of the prize that i gets, so the alliance playersexpected payo¤ is determined by
E(i) = pAB  (siAB  V )   xi; where siAB = xi=XAB. Although both qiAB and
siAB are equal to xi=XAB, the former indicates a conditional winning probability,
the latter represents the proportion of the prize. For given e¤ort choices, alli-
ance players in Arandom treatments face a lower winning probability for a higher
prize, whereas those in Aproportion have a higher winning probability for a lower
prize. However, because the expected values of the two lotteries are the same,
the expected-payo¤ maximizing equilibrium e¤ort should be identical in all three
treatments (see Table 1). The ex post outcome is very di¤erent in Aproportion
and Arandom treatment though. The tiny change from Arandom to Aproportion
strengthens the tie between the alliance players and makes the alliance manipula-
tion more salient. This manipulation enables me to test if increasing the saliency
of alliance features (without changing the expected payo¤) further inuences the
contest behavior of both alliance players and individual players.11
The experiment was run in the MELESSA laboratory at the University of
Munich. The participants were recruited and included students from all elds.12
Each of the 216 total participants undewent 24 rounds of the same treatment and
kept their individual role as player A, B, or C throughout all rounds. Anonym-
ity between subjects was preserved throughout the experiment, and the payment
procedure ensured that the laboratory sta¤ could not link individual behavior
the case in this experiment.
11Heterogeneous risk preference, misperception of winning probabilities, and joy of winning
might explain over-dissipation in contests, which could also drive di¤erent behavior in Apro-
portion and Arandom treatments. Other psychological motivations or certain social preferences
might play roles as well. Identifying the impact of each of these factors is interesting but bey-
ond the scope of this paper. As a rst step, this study is mainly explorative. Narrowing down
the potential candidate set based on the experimental results is possible, as I detail in the next
section.
12The participants were recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner 2004). The experiment was
programmed using Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
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Treatment Base Arandom Aproportion
Prize 450 450 450
Players A,B,C AB,C AB,C
Winner A, or B, or C A, or B, or C AB or C
(xA, x

B , x

C
) (100,100,100) (100,100,100) (100,100,100)
Total dissipation rate 2
3
2
3
2
3
(P A; P

B; P

C
) (1
3
,1
3
,1
3
) (1
3
,1
3
,1
3
) (2
3
,2
3
,1
3
)
(
A
; 
B
, 
C
) (50, 50, 50) (50, 50, 50) (50, 50, 50)
Table 1: Treatment specications and theoretical predictions with risk-neutrality.
to the individual students. During the experiments, students were divided six-
person groups and re-matched within these groups in each round to eliminate
quasi-repeated games e¤ects. The precise division of the subgroups was not ex-
plained to the participants during the experiment; rather, they knew only that
they would be randomly rematched with other players in each round and could
play with and/or against di¤erent people in di¤erent rounds.13 The instructions
were provided and also read to them by the laboratory sta¤, and an entry quiz
guided them through the experiment to ensure proper understanding. In addi-
tion of a participation fee of EUR 4, they received a xed payment of EUR 0:6,
for each round played.14 To reduce possible e¤ects of good or bad luck in earlier
rounds, subjects were paid according to their decisions and outcomes in 6 random
rounds out of 24, at the end of the experiment. The average earnings per subject
were EUR 20 in total. Before nishing the session, participants answered an exit
questionnaire. The time for sessions in all treatments was very similar and took
roughly 1.5 hours.
13This design o¤ers a good compromise between the problem of repeated game e¤fects and the
quest for su¢ cient independent observations.
14In previous contest experiments, participants have been given per-round endowments in
experimental currency, and then they decide how much they should invest. Price and Sheremeta
(2011) nd that over-dissipation relates positively to the amount of endowment participants
receive though. The xed payment in this experiment is another form of endowment (given in
real currency) on which participants cannot easily base their e¤ort choices.
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3 Results
Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, alliance players expend less e¤ort
(compared with a contest without alliances in the Base treatment) when the prize
is shared between the two alliance players. However, when there is only one nal
winner in the alliance, alliance players behave the same as if there were no alliance.
Alliance formation intimidates stand-alone players (especially women), such that
more single players expend very little e¤ort or no e¤ort when they confront one
united strongeropponent rather than two single and symmetric opponents. In
this section, I establish these results by rst presenting the summary statistics and
then examining individual behavior.
3.1 Treatment e¤ects
Figure 1: Average e¤ort by treatment, period and player.
In Figure 1, I depict the average e¤ort for every three periods in each treatment.
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The solid line with circles illustrates the average e¤ort for all three players in
the Base treatment. Players expend around 150 units on average in the Base
treatment, which is 50% higher than the equilibrium prediction. This result is in
line with the results in previous experimental contests. To examine the impact of
alliance formation, I plot the average e¤ort for alliance players and single players
separately in the Arandom and Aproportion treatments. Compared with the Base
treatment, alliance players in Arandom expend similar e¤ort 148 units on average
(see the dotted line with circles). However, the average e¤ort expended by player
C in Arandom is much lower (116), as also shown in Figure 1 by the dotted line
with triangles for player C, which is much lower than the solid line, especially
in later periods. When the prize is shared proportionally between the alliance
players, the deviation from the Base treatment reverses. The alliance players in
the Aproportion treatment invest signicantly less e¤ort than players in the Base
treatment, or 127 units on average (dashed line with circles), whereas the average
e¤ort expended by player C (145 units on average) is not much di¤erent from
that in the Base treatment (dashed lines with triangles for single players and with
circles for alliance players in Figure 1).
Alliances Compared with Base Player C Compared withBase
Data set (Period) 1-24 1-12 13-24 1-24 1-12 13-24
Constant 162.3*** 164.3*** 161.3*** 165.1*** 167.0*** 164.0***
(7.95) (7.78) (9.41) (9.47) (9.25) (11.85)
Arandom 1.93 -6.44 9.95 -45.35** -33.49* -60.70**
(12.60) (12.31) (14.97) (18.96) (18.49) (23.85)
Aproportion -32.13** -36.99*** -28.57* -12.09 -4.89 -27.02
(12.56) (12.27) (14.85) (18.98) (18.52) (23.83)
Log-likelihood -19056 -9742 -9248 -13071 -6669 -6319
Wald 2 8.18** 9.65*** 6.13** 5.73* 3.32 6.75**
Left-censored obs. 55 28 27 160 54 106
Uncensored obs. 3215 1644 1571 2099 1073 1026
Right-censored obs. 714 344 370 597 313 284
Note: In all regressions, data in the Base treatment are the benchmark.
*** p-value<.01. ** p-value<.05. * p-value<.10.
Table 2: Random-e¤ect Tobit regressions on e¤ort choices
Using random-e¤ect Tobit regressions, I can conrm that the di¤erences in
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Figure 1 are statistically signicant.15 The regression results are provided in Table
2. In two sets of regressions, I compare the alliance players (A and B) and single
players (C) separately with the players in the Base treatment. The dependent
variable is the e¤ort choice of each individual player. The potential independ-
ent variables are the treatment dummies (Arandom and Aproportion). I report
regressions for the full data set and for either the rst or the second half of the
experiment to investigate if there are the dynamic changes in behavior. Alliance
players in the Aproportion treatment overall expend around 32 points less than
the players in the Base treatment. This di¤erence is slightly bigger in the rst half
of the experiment than in the second half (36.99 vs. 28.57).16 However, alliance
players in the Arandom treatment expend similar e¤ort as in the Base treatment.
Single players expend much less e¤ort (45 points) in Arandom treatment than in
the Base treatment, and the di¤erences increase and become more signicant in
periods 13 to 24 (61 points, p-value<.05) compared with periods1 to 12 (33 points,
p-value<.1). Although the single players in Aproportion also expend less e¤ort,
especially in later periods (-27.02), the coe¢ cients are not signicant.
To further examine treatment di¤erences at the individual level of the data, I
plot histograms of e¤ort choices by player A/B or player C in di¤erent treatments
in Figure 2. First, the e¤ort choices are widely distributed between 0 and 250.
Second, the lower panel of the graph, which lists the histograms of alliance players
individual e¤ort, indicates that the two distributions for the Base and theArandom
treatment look almost identical. E¤orts are distributed fairly evenly between 0 to
200, with a spike (of around 40% of the observations) in the range of 200 to 250 in
both treatments. However, the spike at the right end disappears in the Aproportion
treatment, and more choices shift to the center of the feasible set. Third, single
players shift their e¤ort choice, either to left or to right end of the distribution,
leaving fewer intermediate e¤orts in the two alliance treatments than in the Base
treatment (see the upper panel of Figure 2).
In summary, alliance formation seems to a¤ect the e¤ort choices of both alli-
ance players and individual players. The nding about the alliance players rules
15The e¤ort choice is restricted between 0 and 250. Thus Tobit models become the natural
selection.
16This can be seen in Figure 1, especially in the last three periods.
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Figure 2: Histograms of e¤ort choice by treatment and player.
out the group spirits hypothesis, because these players expend equal or less
(rather than more) e¤ort than individual players. Players risk preference also
seem stable, irrespective of whether they play in an alliance or individually, be-
cause behavioral shifts from the Base treatment to the Arandom treatment are
not observed.17 Finally, I propose that the reduced e¤ort contribution in the Apro-
portion treatment can be explained by the joy of winning. Assuming players earn
extra non-monetary utility from winning is similar to allowing for an extra prize to
the nal winner(s). This extra non-monetary utility has a public-good nature in
the Aproportion treatment but not in the Base or Arandom treatments, because
these latter treatments feature one nal winner. Therefore, alliance formation in
Aproportion induces free-riding incentives for the alliance players to gain this ex-
tra prize, leading to reduced e¤ort. Although the prediction might be di¤erent
depending on whether people gain the same amount of non-monetary utility when
they win alone or together with others, or whether the utility varies with the size
17Sheremeta and Zhang (2010) indicate that groups make less risky decisions than individuals.
The major di¤erence between their nding and my nding is that there is no communication
in my experiment, and decisions are made independently rather than jointly. In other words,
simply being in a group does not change playersrisk preference, but the interactions between
group members might.
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of the prize, one can at least show that alliance players should reduce their e¤ort
and single players should increase their e¤ort in the Aproportion treatment, com-
pared with the Base and Arandom treatments, if the extra utility from winning
is the same irrespective of whether the prize is shared, using the simple joy-of-
winning model proposed by Sheremeta (2010). The detailed solutions are in the
Appendix.18
Single players (ghting against an alliance) might feel lonesome or have less
condence than they actually should have about winning the contest such that
they greatly reduce their e¤ort. Being in a weakerposition, single players also
might perceive winning as a great challenge and thus derive more joy of winning
from it, in which case they would ght very hard. The former type of players
should exhibit greater need to belong and lower joy of winning than the latter
type. The shifts observed in Figure 2 for player C suggest that both types of
players appear in the subject pool. Therefore, an analysis that combines the
individual characteristics and e¤ort choices should reveal types of players.
3.2 Gender di¤erences among stand-alone players
Figure 2 shows that individual e¤ort choice is rather heterogeneous. To determin
who deviates and in what direction in the alliance treatments, I summarize the
e¤ort choice for di¤erent groups of players, according to their individual charac-
teristics (e.g., age, gender, discipline in university study). Neither alliance players
e¤ort choices nor e¤ort choices in the Base treatment depend heavily on these
individual traits.19 However, when alliance formation leads to group asymmetry
(2 versus 1), male and female single players behave di¤erently. To elaborate this
point, I present both summary statistics (see Table 3) and histograms of single
playerse¤orts (in alliance treatments) by gender (see Figure 3). I again split the
data into the rst and second 12 periods to detect dynamic changes.
18In Figure 1, the average e¤ort choices of both alliance players and single players in the initial
periods (1-3) in Aproportion exactly follow the direction of this prediction. Later deviation from
this equilibrium by single players is the result of learning and reactions to previous success/failure.
19Summary statistics according to these characteristics for alliance players and players in the
Base treatment are therefore ommited.
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Arandom Aproportion
Period 1-12 12-24 1-12 12-24
Male: 176 124 157 174
(87) (107) (102) (100)
Female: 104 99 148 126
(91) (97) (89) (94)
Note: Standard deviations in brackets.
Table 3: Average e¤ort of single players (C) by gender.
In Arandom, female playersaverage e¤ort is 104 units in period 1 to 12 and
then falls to 99 in periods 13 to 24; in contrast, however, male players start with
very high average e¤ort (176) in the rst 12 periods and then reduce it to 124 units
in the second half of the experiments (see the second and third columns in Table
3). This trend corresponds to the individual choices presented in four histograms
on the left side of Figure 3. Almost 60% of choices made by male players are
above 200 in periods 1 to 12, but this number drops to around 40% in periods 13
to 24, accompanied by an increase in the choices below 50 from around 10% in
periods 1-12 to 35% in periods 13-24. For female players in Arandom, more than
35% of their choices are below 50, and around 30% of the choices are above 200;
this distribution does not change signicantly in the second half. This di¤erence
between male and female single players also indicates that the sharp decline in the
average e¤ort time series for player C in the Arandom treatment (Figure 1) was
caused mainly by the dramatic shifts men made.
In Aproportion, the dynamics are slightly di¤erent. Both male and female play-
ers starts with similar e¤ort (157 vs. 148), but then move in opposite directions.
Male playersaverage e¤ort increases to 174, while female playerse¤ort reduces
to 126. Looking at the full distributions on the right side of Figure 3, around 20%
of the players (both male and female) expend less than 50, and 50-60% of the
players expend more than 200 in the rst half of the experiment. However, men
respond with more extremely high e¤ort (i.e., choices above 200 increase from 60%
to 70%) in periods 13 to 24, and womens respond with less extremely high e¤ort
(i.e., choices above 200 decrease from 50% to around 35%) but more extremely
low e¤ort (i.e., choices below 50 increase from 20% to 30%).
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Figure 3: Histogram of single playerse¤ort choice (by treatment and gender).
These observations suggest that men tend to ght harder initially when they
contest a two-player alliance. However, they also quickly respond to their success
or failure. In the Arandom treatment, the joint e¤ort of alliance players is approx-
imately twice that of the single players, so single players often lose the contest.
Therefore, male single players soon greatly reduce their e¤ort. In Aproportion, the
lower joint e¤ort by the alliance players allows single players to win more often
than in the Arandom treatment. As a result, male single players pick the extremely
high e¤ort more often in the second half of the experiment. However, female single
players are always more likely to drop out or expend less e¤ort in the contest when
they face a two-player alliance rather than two individual players.
These results are in line with recent studies on gender di¤erence. Controlling
for the ability of men and women, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) nd that men are
twice as likely as women to join a tournament, mainly because of their greater in-
terest in (preference for) for competition and their higher levels of over-condence.
Furthermore, Healy and Pate (2011) nd that the gender gap declines by two-
thirds if competition takes place in two-person teams, irrespective of the gender
of ones partner. Potential candidates, such as risk or feedback aversion or con-
dence, have been ruled out as major reasons. Instead, women appear not to like
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competition if they must compete alone, whereas they feel much more comfortable
when they have a partner. In summary, these results indicate that women tend to
have more intrinsic need to belong to a group and enjoy the joy-of-winning less if
they have to ght alone rather than in a group.20
3.3 Rent dissipation and social welfare
After examining the e¤ort choice for di¤erent groups of players in di¤erent treat-
ments, I turn to the impact of alliance formation on the total rate of dissipation
and individual prots. Table 4 shows that players in Base treatment dissipate
more than 100% of the prize (457.2), and this over-dissipation on average leads
to negative prot ( -2.4 points). Over-dissipation declines when there is alliance
formation, such that total dissipation is 411.2 in Arandom and 399.9 in Apropor-
tion, as a result of the lower e¤ort expended by alliance players or single players.
Consequently, the average prots of each individual player improve in the two ex-
perimental treatments, especially for alliance players. The average payo¤ is highest
in the group of alliance players under proportional sharing rules (25 points). Not
surprisingly, in a post-experiment questionaire, a majority of respondants indic-
ated that they would have preferred to be in an alliance, had they been given the
opportunity to choose. In particular, 65% of the alliance players and 83% of the
single players in the Aproportion treatment, and 54% of the alliance players and
58% of the single players in the Arandom treatment, chose yesin response to this
question. In conclusion, alliance formation can benet both alliance players and
single players by reducing wasteful resource dissipation in rent-seeking contests.
4 Conclusion
Alliance formation is often observed in rent-seeking contests, political elections,
wars, and so on. However, there are two major disadvantages of alliances: the
free-riding problem and the potential threat of internal conict when it comes
to dividing the prize after alliance victory. In this article, I study alliance form-
20Interested readers should refer to Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a review of gender di¤erences
in both individual competition and in risk and social preferences.
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Treatment Base Arandom Aproportion
Players A/B/C A/B C A/B C
Payo¤ (by role) -2.4 13.3 12.1 25.1 -0.1
(206) (208.8) (182.2) (113.1) (192.1)
Payo¤ (overall) -2.4 12.9 16.7
(206) (200) (144.7)
Total dissipation 457.2 411.2 399.9
(158.6) (172.3) (126.6)
Notes: Standard deviations are in brackets.
Table 4: Summary of dissipation rate and average payo¤s.
ation with share proportional rules to abstract away from these two potential
disadvantages of alliance formation. By comparing e¤ort choices in contests with
exogenously formed alliances (with proportional rules) against e¤ort choices in in-
dividual contests, I examine whether behavioral factors such as need to belong,
group spirits, and joy of winning make the alliance more attractive, even when
there is no actual expected monetary gain from alliance formation. People expend
less e¤ort if they are in an alliance and share the prize proportionally, compared
with when they play in individual contests. However, this e¤ect disappears if the
alliance is temporary, such that only one player in the alliance is entitled to the
full prize in the end. This nding is consistent with predictions derived from a
simple model that incorporates the non-monetary utility of winning. Moreover,
alliance formation has a signicant impact on single players, even if the alliance is
temporary. Female players are always more likely to be discouraged by the alliance
and expend lower e¤ort, whereas male single players initially expend higher e¤ort
and soon move in opposite directions depending on whether they win or not. The
gender di¤erence in contest behavior suggests that female players have higher need
to belong and derive much less non-monetary utility from winning if they must
compete individually against a group. Because over-dissipation is a wide-spread
phenomenon in contest experiments, both alliance players and stand-alone players
benet from alliance formation due to reduced over-dissipation.
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A A simple joy-of-winning model
In this appendix, I provide a simple theoretical model that takes the non-monetary
utility of winning into consideration. Suppose each player gain additional utility w
if he or she wins the prize, irrespective of whether the prize is shared with another
player or not. The expected-payo¤ functions and their corresponding equilibrium
solutions for each treatment are given in the following.
In the Base treatment, the expected utility is given by
E(i) = pi(xi; x i)(V + w)  xi; (1)
and the expected-payo¤ maximizing e¤ort choice is given by:
x =
2
9
(V + w): (2)
It is trivial to show that the prediction does not change for the Arandom
treatment, because the alliance formation in Arandom does not alter the objective
function for all players.21 However, in theAproportion treatment, both the winning
probability and the actual monetary price received di¤ers for the alliance players.
Therefore, the new expected payo¤ function is given by:
E(i) =

p
AB
 (siAB  V + w)  xi for player A or B
pi(xi; x i)(V + w)  xi for player C

: (3)
Consequently, the equilibrium e¤ort choices that solve that rst-order condition
are:
21An important assumption in this model is that the non-monetary utility of winning (w) is only
accompanied by the award of the prize and does not change with the actual prize value received
by the players. In particular, in the Arandom treatment, alliance players might win against
the single player, but if he or she does not receive the prize after the random-draw within the
alliance, he or she does not gain w. This assumption is slightly di¤erent from Sheremeta (2010)s
assumption that players gain non-monetary utility of winning from each stage, irrespective of
whether it is the intermediate or the nal stage. With properly specied values/functions for w,
these two di¤erent assumptions can lead to qualitatively equivalent equilibrium outcomes.
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xi =
 (2w+V )2(w+V )
2(3w+2V )2
for player A or B
(2w+V )(w+V )2
(3w+2V )2
for player C

: (4)
It is easy to prove that xA = x

B
22 < x < xC
23: Therefore, if players substract
extra non-monetary utility from winning the prize, alliance players should expend
less e¤ort, and single players should expend more e¤ort in Aproportion than in the
other two treatments.
B Experimental instructions (for online public-
ation)
B.1 Base treatment
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully and com-
pletely. Properly understanding the instructions will help you make better de-
cisions and hence earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of
the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in
private. For each 45 Talers you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. Therefore,
the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at the end of todays exper-
iment. In addition to the Talers earned during the experiment, each participant
will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other par-
ticipants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to
leave the laboratory without getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please
raise your hand; an experimenter will come to you.
22xA   x = xB   x =   118 V(2V+3w)2
 
7V 2 + 19V w + 12w2

< 0:
23xC   x = 19 V(2V+3w)2
 
V 2 + 4V w + 3w2

> 0:
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B.1.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you
will rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions
will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the experiment, groups
consisting of three people are formed. These groups are randomly composed in
each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The money you
earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your
group.
Let the three players in one group be called A, B, and C. In each round, three
players A, B, and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition works as
follows:
1. In a rst stage, all players will simultaneously choose an e¤ort level. Each
player decides independently on his or her own e¤ort level. A players e¤ort
is chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to the amount
of Talers the player would like to expend in the competition to win the prize.
You will have to pay this amount of Talers to the lab, whether or not you
win the competition. In the following, player As e¤ort is denoted by XA,
player Bs e¤ort is denoted by XB, and similarly player Cs e¤ort is denoted
by XC .
2. Then, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players in your
group have expended. The total expense is equal to the sum of all players
e¤orts: XA +XB +XC .
3. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether player A; or player B;
or player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see, the fortune wheel is
divided into three colors - yellow, green, and blue. The yellow color represents
the Talers spent by player A (i.e., XA), the green color represents the Talers
spent by player B (i.e., XB), and the blue color represents the Talers spent by
player C (i.e., XC). The three colored areas on the wheel represent exactly
each players shares in the total expense (i.e., XA +XB +XC).
4. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the
top. After some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly.
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If the arrow stops in the yellow-colored area, player A wins the prize; if the
arrow stops in the green-colored area, player B wins the prize; if the arrow
stops in the blue-colored area, player C wins the prize. This means that the
probability that player A or B or C wins the prize is equal to his or her
corresponding share of the e¤ort in the total expense, hence
Probability that i wins =
e¤ort Xi
total expense XA +XB +XC
;
where i denotes A or B or C. For your information, the winning probability
of every player will be displayed to you.
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on his or
her own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures of the
other players in the group. Note that the more Talers a player spends, the
more likely it is that he or she wins the competition. More e¤ort expended,
however, means that a player has to pay more Talers to the lab.
5. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., XA = XB = XC = 0 , then it
is equally likely that A, or B;or C wins. If two players (e.g., A and B) both
do not expend any Taler, but the third player (e.g., C) expends at least one
Taler, the third player (i.e., C) wins the competition.
6. Every player has to pay e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome
of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated
as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings=gain-e¤ort. The
winning player gets the prize of 450 Taler and the losing players get nothing.
The winning players earnings = 450 Xi, while the losing playersearnings=
 Xi.
B.1.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have
the same role (player A, or B, or C). The other two players in your group will be
randomly assigned to you in each round.
You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions
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you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to
anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some
questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All
the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly condential.
At the end of todays experiment, we will randomly choose 6 rounds out of
24 to pay you. Your total earnings in those 6 rounds will be added up, converted
to euros, and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other rounds
will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay the e¤orts of these rounds
either. You will get to know which 6 out of the 24 rounds will be chosen only after
nishing these 24 rounds.
In addition to your earnings from these 6 selected rounds, you will receive 0.60
euros for each of the 24 rounds you have played.
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions (which are related
to the actions in the experiment) through the computer screen.
B.2 Arandom treatment
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully and com-
pletely. Properly understanding the instructions will help you to make better
decisions and hence earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of
the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you
in private. For each 45 Talers you earn, you will be paid 1 Euro in cash.
Therefore, the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at the end of
todays experiment. In addition to the Talers earned during the experiment, each
participant will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other par-
ticipants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to
leave the laboratory without getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please
raise your hand; an experimenter will come to you.
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B.2.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you
will rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions
will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the experiment, groups
consisting of three people are formed. These groups are randomly composed in
each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The money you
earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your
group.
Let the three players in one group be called A, B, and C. In each round, three
players A, B, and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition works as
follows:
1. Two players A and B form an alliance. Player C is playing on his or her
own.
2. Your role in the experiment will be that of player A, B, or C. This role
will be randomly assigned to you. Each participant will keep his or her role
throughout the entire experiment.
3. In a rst stage, all players will simultaneously choose an e¤ort level. Each
player decides independently on his or her own e¤ort level. A players e¤ort
is chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to the amount
of Talers the player would like to expend in the competition to win the prize.
You will have to pay this amount of Talers to the lab, whether or not you
win the competition. In the following, player As e¤ort is denoted by XA,
player Bs e¤ort is denoted by XB, and similarly player Cs e¤ort is denoted
by XC .
4. Then, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players in your
group have expended. The e¤orts of player A and B will be added up, and
the sum of XA and XB corresponds to the e¤ort that the alliance of players
A and B spends on the competition. The total expense is equal to the sum
of all playerse¤orts: XA +XB +XC .
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5. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether the alliance consisting
of A and B or whether player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see,
the fortune wheel is divided into two colors - red and blue. The red color
represents the total Talers spent by players A and B (i.e., XA +XB). The
blue color represents the Talers spent by player C (i.e., XC ). The two
colored areas on the wheel represent exactly their shares in the total expense
(i.e., XA +XB +XC).
6. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the
top. After some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly.
If the arrow stops in the red-colored area, players A and B win the prize.
If the arrow stops in the blue-colored area, player C wins the prize. This
means that the probability that players A and B win the prize is equal to
their share of their joint e¤ort in the total expense, hence
probability that A and B win =
e¤ort XA + e¤ort XB
total expense XA +XB +XC
:
Equivalently, the probability that player C wins the prize is equal to the
share of Cs e¤ort in the total expense:
probability that C wins =
e¤ort XC
total expense XA +XB +XC
:
For your information, the probabilities that either the alliance of A and B
or player C wins the competition will be displayed to you.
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on his or
her own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures of the
other players in the group. Note that the more Talers a player spends, the
more likely it is that he or she wins the competition. More e¤ort expended,
however, means that a player has to pay more Talers to the lab.
7. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., XA = XB = XC = 0 , then
it is equally likely that either the alliance A and B or player C wins. If
players A and B both do not expend any Taler, but player C expends at
least one Taler, player C wins the competition. If player C does not expend
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any Taler, but either player A or player B (or both) expends at least one
Taler, the alliance A and B wins the competition.
8. Every player has to pay e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome
of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated
as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings=gain-e¤ort.
 In case player C wins, the competition ends and he or she gets the
450-Taler-prize; players A and B will gain nothing. While players A
and B do not have any gain, but have to pay their e¤orts, the earnings
of player C are calculated as follows: Cs earnings = 450 XC . The
earnings of player A or B are equal to  XA or  XB, respectively.
 In case the alliance of A andB wins the competition, player Cs earnings
= XC : One player out of the alliance will then be randomly drawn by
the computer as the nal winner for the 450-Taler-prize, whereas the
other player gets nothing. The winning probability for this second
random draw is again determined by the e¤orts contributed
in the contest against player C.
probability that A wins =
e¤ort XA
total expense XA +XB
:
probability that B wins =
e¤ort XB
total expense XA +XB
:
Therefore, the earnings are 450 XA for player A and  XB for player
B if A wins;  XA for player A and 450 XB for player B if B wins.
B.2.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have
the same role (player A, B, or C). The other two players in your group will be
randomly assigned to you in each round.
You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions
you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to
anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some
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questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All
the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly condential.
At the end of todays experiment, we will randomly choose 6 rounds out of
24 to pay you. Your total earnings in those 6 rounds will be added up, converted
to euros, and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other rounds
will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay the e¤orts of these rounds
either. You will get to know which 6 out of the 24 rounds will be chosen only after
nishing these 24 rounds.
In addition to your earnings from these 6 selected rounds, you will receive 0.60
euros for each of the 24 rounds you have played .
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions (which are related
to the actions in the experiment) through the computer screen.
B.3 Aproportion treatment
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully and com-
pletely. Properly understanding the instructions will help you to make better
decisions and hence earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end of
the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and pay you in
private. For each 45 Talers you earn you will be paid 1 Euro in cash. Therefore,
the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at the end of todays exper-
iment. In addition to the Talers earned during the experiment, each participant
will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other par-
ticipants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be asked to
leave the laboratory without getting paid. Whenever you have a question, please
raise your hand; an experimenter will come to you.
B.3.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 24 rounds. Before the actual experiment starts, you
will rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment. The questions
will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the experiment, groups
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consisting of three people are formed. These groups are randomly composed in
each round. Your task in each round is to make some decisions. The money you
earn depends on your decision and the decisions of the two other players in your
group.
Let the three players in one group be called A, B, and C. In each round, three
players A, B, and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition works as
follows:
1. Two players A and B form an alliance. Player C is playing on his or her
own.
2. Your role in the experiment will be that of player A, B, or C. This role
will be randomly assigned to you. Each participant will keep his or her role
throughout the entire experiment.
3. In a rst stage, all players will simultaneously choose an e¤ort level. Each
player decides independently on his or her own e¤ort level. A players e¤ort
is chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to the amount
of Talers the player would like to expend in the competition to win the prize.
You will have to pay this amount of Talers to the lab, whether or not you
win the competition. In the following, player As e¤ort is denoted by XA,
player Bs e¤ort is denoted by XB, and similarly player Cs e¤ort is denoted
by XC .
4. Then, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players in your
group have expended. The e¤orts of player A and B will be added up, and
the sum of XA and XB corresponds to the e¤ort that the alliance of players
A and B spends on the competition. The total expense is equal to the sum
of all playerse¤orts: XA +XB +XC .
5. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether the alliance consisting
of A and B or whether player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you will see,
the fortune wheel is divided into two colors - red and blue. The red color
represents the total Talers spent by player A and B (i.e., XA+XB). The blue
color represents the Talers spent by player C (i.e., XC ). The two colored
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areas on the wheel represent exactly their shares in the total expense (i.e.,
XA +XB +XC).
6. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing to the
top. After some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops randomly.
If the arrow stops in the red-colored area, players A and B win the prize.
If the arrow stops in the blue-colored area, player C wins the prize. This
means that the probability that players A and B win the prize is equal to
their share of their joint e¤ort in the total expense, hence
probability that A and B win =
e¤ort XA + e¤ort XB
total expense XA +XB +XC
:
Equivalently, the probability that player C wins the prize is equal to the
share of Cs e¤ort in the total expense:
probability that C wins =
e¤ort XC
total expense XA +XB +XC
:
For your information, the probabilities that either the alliance of A and B
or player C wins the competition will be displayed to you.
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on his or
her own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures of the
other players in the group. Note that the more Talers a player spends, the
more likely it is that he or she wins the competition. More e¤ort expended,
however, means that a player has to pay more Talers to the lab.
7. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., XA = XB = XC = 0 , then
it is equally likely that either the alliance A and B or player C wins. If
players A and B both do not expend any Taler, but player C expends at
least one Taler, player C wins the competition. If player C does not expend
any Taler, but either player A or player B (or both) expends at least one
Taler, the alliance A and B wins the competition.
8. Every player has to pay e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespective of the outcome
of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round will be calculated
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as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort: earnings=gain-e¤ort.
 In case player C wins, the competition ends and he or she gets the
450-Taler-prize; players A and B will gain nothing. While players A
and B do not have any gain, but have to pay their e¤orts, the earnings
of player C are calculated as follows: Cs earnings = 450 XC . The
earnings of player A or B are equal to  XA or  XB, respectively.
 In case the alliance of A and B wins the competition, then players A
and B share the prize according to how much each player has expended
in the contest against player C. Let SA and SB denote the share of
450-Thaler-prize entitled to player A and B, respectively:
SA =
e¤ort XA
e¤ortXA + e¤ortXB
;
SB =
e¤ort XB
e¤ortXA + e¤ortXB
;
Therefore, player As earnings equal
SA  450  e¤ortXA = e¤ort XA  450e¤ortXA + e¤ortXB   e¤ortXA;
player Bs earnings equal
SB  450  e¤ortXB = e¤ort XB  450e¤ortXA + e¤ortXB   e¤ortXB;
and player Cs earnings = XC .
B.3.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 24 identical rounds. In each round, you will have
the same role (player A, B, or C). The other two players in your group will be
randomly assigned to you in each round.
You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the decisions
you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your identity to
anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to answer some
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questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender, age, major...). All
the information you provide will be kept anonymous and strictly condential.
At the end of todays experiment, we will randomly choose 6 rounds out of
24 to pay you. Your total earnings in those 6 rounds will be added up, converted
to euros, and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings of all other rounds
will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay the e¤orts of these rounds
either. You will get to know which 6 out of the 24 rounds will be chosen only after
nishing these 24 rounds.
In addition to your earnings from these 6 selected rounds, you will receive 0.60
euros for each of the 24 rounds you have played .
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions (which are related
to the actions in the experiment) through the computer screen.
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